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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah entered judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, on June 30, 2000. See Judgment contained in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
PRESERVATION 
Issue. The state charged Appellant/Defendant Joseph Tunzi ("Joseph" or 
"Appellant") with attempted homicide pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996). A jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide but 
convicted him of a lesser offense which is not a Serious Youth Offender offense. The 
issue in this case is whether the district court lost jurisdiction and was required to remand 
the case to the juvenile court when the jury acquitted Joseph of the Serious Youth 
Offender charge. 
Standard of review. This issue involves a question of statutory construction which 
is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Kreuger. 1999 UT App 54, ^ flO, 975 P.2d 489 
(citation omitted). 
Preservation. Joseph moved to transfer this case back to juvenile court after he 
was acquitted of attempted homicide and convicted of the lesser charge of aggravated 
assault. R. 222:5-11. After his conviction was reversed on appeal, Joseph did not renew 
his motion. Although Joseph pleaded guilty following remand, this issue is nevertheless 
properly before this Court since it involves a question as to whether the district court had 
jurisdiction over Joseph's case. See State v. PeranL 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992) 
(guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional claims); see discussion infra at 6-8. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), the Serious Youth Offender statute, is 
determinative of the issue on appeal. The text of that statute is in Addendum B. The text 
of the direct file statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (1996), and the certification statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (1996), is also in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state filed an Information dated November 5, 1998 in juvenile court, charging 
Joseph with attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203 & 76-4-101 (1999). Pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), the juvenile court bound Joseph over to district 
2 
court for trial. R. 12. 
Following a jury trial held on April 22-23, 1999, a jury acquitted Joseph of 
attempted homicide and convicted him of the lesser charge of aggravated assault which 
had been requested by the state. R. 73, 77, 108. Because the elements instruction 
included elements for both the third and second degree felony versions of aggravated 
assault, the trial judge entered judgment for the third degree felony and sentenced Joseph 
to serve zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. R. 117.1 Prior to sentencing, Joseph 
moved to transfer the case back to juvenile court because the jury had acquitted him of 
the Serious Youth Offender charge, and the third degree felony for which he was 
convicted was not a Serious Youth Offender offense over which the district court had 
jurisdiction. R. 222:5-10. The trial judge denied that motion. R. 222:11. 
In the original appeal, Joseph moved for summary reversal of his conviction when 
it was discovered that the videotape and transcript of one day of a two-day trial were 
missing. R. 136, 141:194. This Court denied the motion for summary reversal and 
1
 The instruction for aggravated assault contained alternative elements for both the 
third and second degree felony versions of that crime. See Instruction number 12 in 
Addendum C. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103, aggravated assault, which 
involves intentionally causing serious bodily injury, is a second degree felony whereas 
aggravated assault involving the use of a dangerous weapon "or other means offeree 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury" is a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1999). After the jury acquitted Joseph of the attempted homicide charge and 
convicted him of aggravated assault based on alternative elements, Joseph argued and the 
state agreed that judgment of conviction must be entered for the third degree felony. 
R. 142:2-4. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony, but refused to remand the case to the juvenile court. R. 142:12, 117. 
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remanded the case to the trial court for reconstruction of the record. On certiorari, the 
Supreme Court reversed that decision and reversed Joseph's conviction and remanded the 
case for a new trial. See State v. TunzL 2000 UT 38, 998 P.2d 816 in Addendum D. 
On remand, the state attempted to proceed with a second degree felony charge of 
either attempted homicide or aggravated assault even though Joseph had been convicted 
of only a third degree felony aggravated assault in the original trial. R. 158-75. The state 
subsequently offered Joseph, who was in custody at the Utah State Prison or Salt Lake 
County Jail throughout the proceedings, a plea bargain whereby Joseph would plead 
guilty to the third degree felony and be given credit for time served and released. 
R. 223:2-5. Joseph ultimately accepted the plea bargain and pleaded guilty to aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony; the trial judge gave Joseph credit for time served and he 
was released. R. 223:2, 9-10. Joseph is appealing his conviction for the sole purpose of 
attempting to return his case to juvenile court. 
On September 7, 2000, this Court issued a sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition. After both parties agreed that summary disposition was not appropriate, this 
Court set the matter for full briefing. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. FACTS REGARDING THE INCIDENT 
The facts of the underlying incident are not pertinent to the issue before the Court 
on appeal. Basically, the facts regarding the underlying incident are that on Halloween 
4 
night, 1998, a fight occurred during which Rocky Vigil was stabbed. The factual issue at 
trial was whether Joseph or Zeb Smith, Joseph's cousin, stabbed Rocky. None of the 
witnesses on the first day of trial testified that Joseph was the person who stabbed Rocky; 
some of the witnesses did, however, implicate Zeb as the stabber. R. 141. 
Apparently, Zeb Smith, who testified on the second day of trial, was the only 
witness whose testimony could arguably be construed as indicating that Joseph was the 
stabber. Since a transcript of the second day of trial does not exist, there was no way of 
determining in the initial appeal whether the details of Zeb5s testimony were sufficient to 
establish that Joseph stabbed Rocky. In addition, Zeb made inconsistent statements at 
the preliminary hearing and to police officers regarding statements Joseph may have 
made to Zeb. R. 28. Zeb was originally suspected of being the stabber and testimony 
from the first day of trial indicated that Zeb, not Joseph, was the person who stabbed 
Rocky. R. 141. 
B. FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
After the jury acquitted Joseph of attempted homicide and convicted him of 
aggravated assault, the trial judge entered judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony. The third degree felony form of aggravated assault is not a Serious 
Youth Offender charge for which a juvenile can be bound over to adult court for trial. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (l)(a) (1996). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issue raised in this appeal of whether the district court lost jurisdiction after 
Appellant was acquitted of the Serious Youth Offender charge which provided the basis 
for the transfer to district court is properly before this Court even though Appellant 
pleaded guilty below. A guilty plea does not waive a jurisdictional claim. 
The Serious Youth Offender Act requires that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction 
when a juvenile is acquitted in district court of the charges which provided the basis for 
the transfer to district court under the Act. The plain language of Subsection (10) of the 
Act and the Act itself when read in its entirety demonstrate that the Serious Youth 
Offender Act requires remand to the juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of the 
serious offense which provided the basis for the transfer to adult court, even if the 
juvenile is convicted of a lesser charge. The legislative history and purpose of the Serious 
Youth Offender Act and reading the Act in harmony with the direct file and certification 
statutes also demonstrate that the trial court erred in this case when it failed to remand this 
case to the juvenile court after Appellant was acquitted of attempted homicide. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO 
SENTENCE JOSEPH AND WAS REQUIRED TO REMAND HIS CASE 
TO THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER THE JURY ACQUITTED HIM OF 
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE. 
A. THIS ISSUE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT ON APPEAL. 
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After the trial judge ruled that conviction would be entered for the third degree 
felony version of aggravated assault, Joseph moved the court to remand his case to 
juvenile court, arguing that the district court had lost jurisdiction over the case. 
R. 222:5-8. The trial judge denied the motion and sentenced Joseph as an adult. 
R. 222:11; 117. Although Joseph did not renew his motion to remand his case to juvenile 
court following reversal of his conviction on appeal and subsequently pleaded guilty to a 
third degree felony as part of a plea bargain, the issue of whether the trial court had 
jurisdiction to sentence Joseph as an adult is nevertheless properly before this Court.2 
While a guilty plea generally waives all non-jurisdictional defects, ff[a] plea of 
guilty does not waive a claim that the court lacks the power to adjudicate a charge against 
defendant." Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1992) (further citations omitted); see also 
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567 at 570 (subject matter jurisdiction "can neither be waived 
nor conferred by consent of the accused"). Indeed, "the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time." Perank, 858 P.2d at 930 (further citation omitted). 
2
 This Court issued a sua sponte motion for summary disposition, ordering both 
parties to address the issue of whether Joseph waived his right to appeal this jurisdictional 
issue when he pleaded guilty following reversal of his conviction on appeal. Joseph 
responded that the issue is properly before this Court because jurisdictional issues cannot 
be waived. The state responded that the issue is sufficiently complex to warrant full 
briefing. Without deciding whether Joseph had waived the jurisdictional issue by 
pleading guilty, this Court denied the motion for summary disposition and deferred 
consideration of the issue raised in the motion "until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case." See "Order Denying and Deferring Motion for Summary 
Disposition" in Addendum E. Joseph therefore addresses this issue in this opening brief. 
7 
In Perank, the defendant "pleaded guilty to the burglary charge and did not raise 
the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the burglary until the 
probation revocation proceeding." Id, The Supreme Court held that Perank's claim that 
"the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of burglary and that the Ute Tribal 
Court had exclusive jurisdiction because he is an Indian and the offense occurred within 
Indian country" was properly before the Court even though Perank had pled guilty to the 
charge. Id.; see also United States v. Morales-Rosales, 838 F.2d 1359, 1361-62 (5th Cir. 
1988) ("the failure of an information to charge an offense is a jurisdictional defect that is 
not waived by a guilty plea"). 
The only issue raised in this appeal is whether the adult court lacked jurisdiction to 
proceed with the case and sentence Joseph after he was acquitted of the Serious Youth 
Offender offense on which he was bound over to that court. Part 6 of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a5 under which Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 is found, deals explicitly with a 
"transfer of jurisdiction" between the juvenile and district court. Because Joseph raises a 
jurisdictional defect in this claim that his case should have been remanded to the juvenile 
court, the issue was not waived by his guilty plea and is properly before this Court on 
appeal. 
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B. PURSUANT TO THE SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER ACT, THE 
ADULT COURT LOST JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE AND WAS 
REQUIRED TO REMAND THE CASE TO JUVENILE COURT FOR 
SENTENCING AFTER THE JURY ACQUITTED JOSEPH OF THE 
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER CHARGE WHICH HAD BEEN THE 
BASIS FOR THE BINDOVER TO ADULT COURT. 
The Serious Youth Offender Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996) ("the Act"), 
allows the juvenile court to transfer a juvenile 16 years or older to adult court for trial on 
certain specified felony charges. The Act designates the nine serious, violent crimes 
which can be tried in adult court as follows: 
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender - Procedure. 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or 
attorney general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony 
shall be by criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the 
information charges any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, 
involving intentionally causing serious bodily injury to 
another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of 
firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted 
aggravated murder; or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection 
(l)(a) involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would 
be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been 
previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving 
9 
the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have been a 
felony if committed by an adult. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(l) (1996). 
In order to bind a juvenile over to adult court, the Act requires that the state 
establish "probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has 
been committed and that the defendant committed it." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(a) 
(1996). When there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed one of the 
serious crimes specified in Subsection (1), the juvenile court is able to retain jurisdiction 
over the juvenile only in the rare case where all of the retention factors set forth in 
Subsection 3(b) are met.3 The essential basis for transferring a case to adult court under 
the Act is therefore the charge that the minor committed a serious and violent crime. 
By its plain language, Subsection (10) of the Act requires that a case be remanded 
to the juvenile court when the defendant is acquitted of the serious offense which 
3
 The three retention factors are: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony 
if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other 
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the 
codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(b). The juvenile court found that the retention factors 
were not met in this case. R. 12. A finding that the retention factors are not met is made 
in the vast majority of Serious Youth Offender cases because the crimes listed in 
subsection (1) are, by their very nature, violent, aggressive or premeditated. 
10 
provided the basis for the bindover. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10). 
Subsection (10) states, "[t]he juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of 
Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in 
the district court." Id. The term "charges" in Subsection (10) necessarily refers to any 
charges which provided the basis for the bindover to district court. In this case, the only 
charge which was one of the nine Serious Youth Offender charges, and, indeed, the only 
charge on which Joseph was bound over to district court, was attempted homicide.4 Since 
Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide, the plain language of Subsection (10) 
required that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction because Joseph was a acquitted of "the 
charges" in district court. See State in the Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091, 1097 (Utah 
App. 1997) (where language of statute is plain and unambiguous, statute will ordinarily 
be interpreted pursuant to plain language). 
While the plain language of Subsection (10) mandates remand of this case to the 
juvenile court, even if Subsection (10) were considered to be ambiguous, resort to rules of 
statutory construction beyond the plain language rule likewise establishes that the 
juvenile court regained jurisdiction when Joseph was acquitted of attempted homicide. 
4
 Aggravated assault was a lesser included offense requested by the state at trial 
after the case was bound over to district court. Since the charge of aggravated assault did 
not arise until trial in district court, it could not be one of the "charges" discussed in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-602. 
11 
lu[I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an 
act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to 
harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose .'" State v. Souza, 846 
P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993) (citations and quotations omitted). In addition, when a 
statute is ambiguous, '"resort to legislative history and purpose for guidance'" is 
appropriate. State in the Interest of A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097 (citing State v. Valdez, 933 
P.2d 400, 401 (Utah App. 1997) (further citation omitted). Moreover, the Act must be 
read in harmony with related statutes, "in this case, Utah's two other statutes for 
prosecuting youthful offenders." State in the Interest of AJEL 936 P.2d at 1097 (citation 
omitted). 
When the Act is read in its entirety, it is apparent that Subsection (10) requires that 
a case be remanded to the juvenile court when a juvenile is acquitted of the serious 
offense which was the basis for the transfer to adult court. Subsection (10) requires that 
the juvenile court regain jurisdiction when the juvenile is acquitted on the "charges"; 
those "charges" are the Serious Youth Offender charges on which the juvenile was bound 
over. In other parts of the Act, the term "charges" refers to the charges pursuant to which 
the case was bound over. For example, Subsection (2) states, "[a]ll proceedings before 
the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection (1) shall be conducted in 
conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-602 (2) (emphasis added). Subsection (7) likewise refers to the charges on which 
12 
the juvenile is bound over to district court. The use of the term "charges" throughout the 
Act to refer to the charges originating in juvenile court on which the case is bound over 
demonstrates that the term "charges" in Subsection (10) refers to the Serious Youth 
Offender charges which qualify the case for adult court. Since Subsection (10) requires 
that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction if the juvenile is acquitted of the "charges," this 
subsection mandates that the adult court lost jurisdiction when Joseph was acquitted of 
the Serious Youth Offender charge. 
Legislative history and the purpose for which the Act was adopted also 
demonstrate that Subsection (10) was intended to require that a case be remanded to 
juvenile court when the juvenile is acquitted of the serious offense which provided the 
basis for transferring the case to adult court. The Legislative purpose for enacting the Act 
was to require that juveniles 16 and 17 years of age who commit violent and aggressive 
offenses, making them as dangerous as adult criminals, be dealt with in the adult system. 
State in the Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1098-1099. The Legislature intended that violent 
and aggressive 16 and 17 year olds, most of whom would eventually end up in the adult 
system, be removed from the juvenile system when they commit one of the nine "very 
serious aggravated offenses" identified by the Legislature as being so violent and 
aggressive that transfer to the adult system is warranted. Id.; see also Utah House and 
Senate Floor Debates, 51st Legislature, General Session (February 9, 1995 and March 1, 
1995) at 3, 11, 14, attached as Addendum F. 
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The Legislature's focus was on holding hardened, seriously violent juvenile 
offenders accountable in the adult system. Id at 3, 4, 14. In passing the Act, the 
Legislature recognized that mechanisms existed in the adult system that would preclude 
youth who commit such offenses from going to prison if such lack of incarceration was 
appropriate. Id. In addition, the Legislature included Subsection (10) which mandates 
that the juvenile court regain jurisdiction if the youth is acquitted of the charges. When 
Subsection (10) is read in light of the legislative purpose to more severely punish in the 
adult system only those youth who commit very serious aggravated offenses, it is evident 
that Subsection (10) requires that the case be remanded to the juvenile court when there is 
not a conviction for the serious, violent offense which was the basis for the transfer to 
adult court. 
Reading the Serious Youth Offender Act in harmony with the two related statutes 
which deal with prosecuting youthful offenders provides additional support for 
interpreting Subsection (10) to require remand when a juvenile is acquitted of the Serious 
Youth Offender offense which provided the basis for transfer of the case to adult court. 
The two related statutes for prosecuting minors in adult court are Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-601 (1996), which requires direct filing in adult court under certain limited 
circumstances, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 (1996), which provides for certification 
of juveniles to be tried as adults under certain circumstances. See State in the Interest of 
A.B..936P.2datl097. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601, the direct file statute, mandates that the district court 
has original jurisdiction over juveniles 16 and older when the juvenile is charged with 
murder or aggravated murder, or if the juvenile was previously committed to a secure 
facility. There is no provision in Section 78-3a-601 for remand to the juvenile court if the 
juvenile is acquitted of the direct file charges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 provides for the certification of juveniles to district 
court when the juvenile judge finds that such certification is appropriate based on a 
finding of one or more of the factors set forth in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603 
contains a subsection with language almost identical to that of Subsection (10) of the Act, 
which provides that the juvenile court regains jurisdiction "when there is an acquittal, a 
finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-603 (14).5 The certification statute, however, contains an additional provision 
which arguably allows the case to remain in district court if the juvenile is convicted of a 
lesser offense or any charges arising from the same criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3a-603(13). Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(13) states, "[a] minor may be convicted 
under this section on the charges filed or on any other offense arising out of the same 
criminal episode." No such language is included in the Serious Youth Offender Act. 
When the Serious Youth Offender Act is considered in conjunction with the direct 
5
 Subsection (14) of the certification statute is identical to Subsection (10) of the 
Act except that it substitutes the word "minor" for the word "juvenile." 
15 
file and certification statutes, it is apparent that the Legislature intended that in the 
context of the Serious Youth Offender Act, the juvenile would be returned to juvenile 
court if he were not convicted in adult court of the serious, aggravated felony which was 
the basis for the transfer. On the one hand, by not including language requiring remand to 
the juvenile court in the direct file statute, the Legislature indicated that when a case is 
directly filed in adult court, the case stays in adult court regardless of the outcome. 
Conversely, by including language requiring remand in the Serious Youth Offender Act, 
the Legislature signaled an intent to return a case to juvenile court when the basis for the 
transfer—commission of one of the nine serious and violent crimes specified by the 
Legislature—is not proved. 
The Legislature's approach to the regaining of jurisdiction by the juvenile court in 
the certification statute likewise demonstrates that the Legislature intended that a Serious 
Youth Offender case be returned to the juvenile court when a juvenile is not convicted of 
the Serious Youth Offender offense. While the precise meaning of the additional 
language in Subsection (13) of the certification statute is unclear, it nevertheless is clear 
that the Legislature chose to include additional language in the certification statute 
clarifying that the procedure outlined in the certification statute applies to the charges 
filed and any other offenses arising out the same criminal episode. Conversely, by not 
including language similar to that of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(13) in the Serious 
Youth Offender Act, the Legislature signaled that the provisions of the Serious Youth 
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Offender Act apply only when a juvenile is convicted of the serious youth offender 
charges. 
The Legislature's choice of more expansive language which includes any offense 
arising out of the criminal episode in the certification statute furthers the purposes served 
by the certification statute. In deciding whether to certify a juvenile to district court, the 
juvenile court considers a number of factors, including the likelihood of rehabilitation. 
State in the Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d at 1098; Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(3). The 
seriousness of the offense, while one of the factors to be considered in the certification 
context, does not have the overriding influence that it does in the Serious Youth Offender 
context. In fact, the juvenile court considers the nature of the juvenile at least as much as 
it does the nature of the crime when it decides to certify a case for adult court treatment. 
After a juvenile court has considered the relevant factors and concluded that a juvenile 
should be certified to adult court, conviction on a lesser included offense therefore does 
not disturb the rationale for certifying the case to adult court. By contrast, when a minor 
is charged with a Serious Youth Offender crime, the rationale for transferring the case to 
adult court is destroyed when the minor is acquitted of the violent crime which was the 
basis for the transfer. 
The Legislature clearly knew how to preclude remand to the juvenile court and 
how to limit remand in situations where the juvenile was convicted of other crimes arising 
out of the same criminal episode. Had the Legislature intended to preclude remand under 
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the Serious Youth Offender Act when a juvenile was convicted of a lesser included 
offense, it would have included language to that effect. Reading the Serious Youth 
Offender Act together with the direct file and certification statutes demonstrates that the 
Legislature intended that a case be remanded to juvenile court if the minor is acquitted of 
the Serious Youth Offender charge which provided the basis for transfer to district court. 
See generally State in the Interest of A.EL 936 P.2d at 1098 (using a similar analysis to 
conclude that "the Legislature did not intend that the juvenile court consider a juvenile's 
rehabilitative prospects11 under the Serious Youth Offender Act"). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) mandates that the juvenile court regain 
jurisdiction when the juvenile is acquitted of the Serious Youth Offender charges which 
provided the basis for the transfer to adult court. Such an interpretation is consistent with 
the plain language, the statute when it is read in its entirety, related statutes for 
prosecuting youthful offenders, and the purpose for which the Act was passed. 
In this case, Joseph was charged only with attempted homicide, one of the 
specified Serious Youth Offender offenses, and bound over to district court on that 
charge. R. 9, 11-12; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(l)(a)(ix). He was acquitted of the 
charge on which he was bound over, and convicted of a non-Serious Youth Offender 
charge. R. 109, 108. Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible error when it 
refused to remand the case to juvenile court after Joseph was acquitted of the "charges." 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Joseph Tunzi respectfully requests that this Court order that 
his adult court conviction be stricken and his case remanded to the juvenile court for entry 
of a juvenile conviction in that court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i&L day of December, 2000. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this Ja> day of 
December, 2000. 
JOAN C. WATT 
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DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of December, 2000. 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
va. 
JOSEPH P TUNZI, 
Defendant, 
MINUTES 
LAW & MOTION 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCEi JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case Not 981926150 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
Date; June 30, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kaylynno 
Prosecutor: FRED BERMISTER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : JOHN O'CONNELL JR 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 13, 1981 
Video 
Tape Number: 2000-46 Tape Count: 10 21 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/30/2000 Guilty Plea 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
HEARING 
TAPE: 2000-46 COUNT: 10 21 
Defendant pled guilty to count 1 as charged. 
Page 1 
Case No; 981926150 
Date: Jun 30, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's convict ion of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant i s sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed f i v e years i n the Utah State Pr ison. 
The prison term i s suspended. 
Credit i s granted for time served. 
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ADDENDUM B 
78-3a-601. Jurisdiction of district court. 
The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 
16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(1) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if commit-
ted by an adult; or 
(2) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the 
TtiiTtnr has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in 
Section 62A-7-101. 
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure. 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney 
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by 
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges 
any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving inten-
tionally causing serious bodily injury to another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery, 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder, or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (lXa) involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have 
been a felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsec-
tion (1), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and 
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the 
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have 
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under 
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless 
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other 
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than 
the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a 
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going 
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above condi-
tions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its 
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but 
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to 
bind the defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall 
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the 
information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest 
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other 
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under 
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need 
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment 
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court 
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consid-
erations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the 
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed 
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound 
over to the district court to answer for those charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court 
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand 
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defen-
dant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of 
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
78-3a-603. Certification hearings — Juvenile court to 
hold preliminary hearing — Factors considered 
by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to 
district court. 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78~3a-
502(3) alleges the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if 
committed by an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going 
forward with its case and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the 
defendant committed it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the 
best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain 
jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests 
of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the 
juvenile court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one or 
more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the 
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by 
juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert 
with two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the 
minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner, 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in 
Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his 
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities 
available to the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one 
court when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who 
will be charged with a crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; 
and 
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in 
Subsection (3) is discretionary with the court. 
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, 
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other 
interested party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing 
the report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and 
cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, 
call witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the 
factors required by Subsection (3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the 
court may enter an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the 
district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examina-
tion held by the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but 
the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the 
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2Kb). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-512, Section 78-3a-513, and other 
provisions relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the 
hearing held under this section to the extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in 
the district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district 
court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have 
the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of 
that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile coin! shall set initial bail 
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section 
or when a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent 
jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense 
described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the Division of Youth 
Corrections and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is 
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him, except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) A minor may be convicted under this section on the charges filed or on 
any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. \2 l 
If after careful consideration, you are unable to find that the defendant, Joseph P. Tunzi 
committed the crime of Attempted Homicide, as charged in the information, you are instructed to 
consider whether the defendant committed the lesser included crime of Aggravated Assault, if 
you find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every on^of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of November, 1998, in Salt Lake County State of 
Utah, the defendant, Joseph P. Tunzi assaulted John R. Vigil and 
2. That the said defendant intentionally or knowingly assaulted John R. Vigil and 
3. That the said defendant then and there intentionally caused serious bodily injury 
to John R. Vigil; or 
4. That the said defendant used a dangerous weapon or other means of force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may 
find the defendant guilty of the lesser included crime of Aggravated Assault in lieu of Count I, 
Attempted Homicide, of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of Aggravated Assault. 
ADDENDUM D 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Joseph P. Tunzi, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 20000022 
F I L E D 
April 14, 2000 
2000 UT 38 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Dep't 
The Honorable Judith S. H. Atherton 
Attorneys: 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
Joan C. Watt, John O'Connell, Jr., Salt Lake City, for defendant 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER 
DURHAM, Justice: 
1J1 Petitioner, Joseph P. Tunzi, by writ of certiorari, seeks review of an order of remand issued by the court of 
appeals directing the trial court to prepare and approve a "statement of the evidence or proceedings" pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 (g). We grant petitioner's writ of certiorari, reverse the court of appeals, 
and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. 
112 Following a two-day trial, petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). Subsequent to his conviction, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal 
raising the following two issues: 
(1) Whether there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict petitioner of aggravated 
assault; and 
(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that it had lost jurisdiction and failing to remand 
the case back to juvenile court. 
Petitioner's counsel thereafter learned that the trial court was unable to locate the videotape of the second day 
of trial, and that a transcript of that day would therefore not be available. As a result, petitioner filed a motion for 
summary reversal in the court of appeals seeking a new trial. The State agreed that such a reversal was 
appropriate. Ultimately, the court of appeals denied petitioner's motion for summary reversal and remanded the 
case with instructions to reconstruct the record of the second day of trial. 
113 We disagree with the court of appeals' action upon petitioner's motion for summary reversal. A main issue 
on appeal in this case is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support petitioner's conviction. 
Resolution of this issue will necessarily involve reviewing the evidence contained in the record. At present, the 
record does not contain evidence presented on the second day of petitioner's two-day trial. During that day, the 
State called half of its witnesses, including the only witness directly implicating petitioner. Thus, fully one half of 
the case against petitioner is missing from the record. While reconstruction of the record may be appropriate in 
circumstances where only a minor portion of the record is missing, such an attempt, in our experience, is 
unduly burdensome for the trial court and the parties when a major portion of the record is missing, as in the 
instant case. Moreover, attempts to reconstruct major portions of records often prove to be futile because such 
reconstructions often fail to provide the detail necessary to resolve the issues on appeal. The burdens and 
futility associated with reconstructing a record are increased exponentially when the issue on appeal concerns 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, as it does here. Therefore, to avoid needless burdens 
and delay, we reverse the court of appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. 
fl4 Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Russon, Justice Durrant, and Justice Wilkins concur in Justice 
Durham's opinion. 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Joseph Tunzi, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
,». FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 1 t 2000 
Pautette Stagg 
Ctertc of the Court 
ORDER DENYING AND 
DEFERRING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 20000728-CA 
This matter is before the court on its own motion for 
summary disposition. Both parties oppose the motion. IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied and that the issues 
raised are deferred until plenary presentation and consideration 
of the case. 
Briefing will be set, when appropriate, by separate notice. 
DATED this 1 / day of October, 2000. 
Qdi&L ffl- BU&9f4) 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on October 11, 2000, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
JOHN D O'CONNELL, JR 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
Dated this October 11, 2000. 
Ijepyyty Clerk / 
Case No. 20000^28-CA 
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SENATE BILL 111 
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Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by 
Senator Hillyard and the Committee Report 
February 6, 1995: "Mr. President, the Human 
Services Committee reports a favorable 
recommendation on Senate Bill 111 with 
amendments on pages 7, 8, 9, 13, and 13. 
Respectfully, Charles Stewart, Acting 
Committee Chair." 
Move we adopt the Committee Report. 
Motion to adopt the Committee Report. All 
those in favor say "aye." 
Aye. 
Are there any opposed? 
(None) 
Seeing no opposition, the bill is before us, 
Senate Bill 111. Senator Hillyard. 
Thank you, Mr. President. I want to direct 
the Senate's attention to the fact that this 
is probably going to be one of the most 
important pieces of legislation that we 
consider this session as it relates to crime, 
and it's a part of a package. It's not the 
sole crime package, but it's part of it. 
The body may also remember a year ago, I 
filed the bill under the same name, quite a 
bit different from this bill. It was Senate 
Bill 249. We had a very interesting debate 
in which I had opposition from a number of 
people in law enforcement because I felt that 
it was doing the proper thing to give more 
power to the juvenile court judges to address 
the serious problems of gang and youth 
violence. 
This body chose to adopt and pass that bill 
unanimously. We realized in passing it, it 
carried a significant fiscal note, but we 
also knew that it would be giving a message 
that we wanted something done in this area. 
And I can report back-- since that action in 
the past year, there has been a tremendous 
amount of work by all the various agencies to 
have come together to bring to you Senate 
Bill 111, which is a serious youth offender 
bill. 
This bill is being supported by a number of 
people including the Governor, the Commission 
on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah 
Sentencing Commission, Utah Substance Abuse 
and Anti-violence Council, Utah Judicial 
Council, juvenile court judges (and I should 
indicate that the juvenile court judges have 
felt left out in the process, now feel very 
much a part of this process in coming to 
grips with this), Board of Youth Corrections, 
Utah Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, 
and many, many others. 
Let me just indicate that the bill does three 
things. Number one, it provides that if a 
youth 16 or 17 years old is charged with 
aggravated murder or murder, which was 
formerly called first or second degree 
murder, if they're charged with this, they 
will be automatically transferred and treated 
in the adult system. 
One of the issues now pending before the Utah 
Supreme Court involves a young man here in 
Salt Lake City who shot and killed another 
person, I think at the Triad Center. The 
case up on appeal is whether our current 
system is legal, where you can be certified 
or directly filed at the discretion of the 
prosecutor. The issue is whether, how much 
discretion the prosecutor can have. And this 
bill takes away from that, and if the 
prosecutor chooses to charge as first or 
second degree murder, aggravated or murder, 
the young man or young woman is automatically 
treated in the adult system. 
The second place where it automatically goes 
is if that youth has been committed to a 
secure facility. They use the term committed 
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in juvenile court. We would talk about 
confinement in a jail. But the committed, 
and then commits a felony, which is another 
serious offense, then they automatically are 
placed in the adult system. The reason being 
is the feeling is that if you have been 
committed in the juvenile court system, that 
is the most severe punishment they can give 
to you. And if that hasn't worked, the 
feeling is that you now completed the, what 
is available in the juvenile court system, 
and you will now, as the saying goes, if you 
commit an adult crime, you'll spend adult 
time. 
The third issue this case creates, and a 
thing that I really like about it, is that it 
lists a number of very serious aggravated 
offenses such as aggravated arson, aggravated 
assault, aggravated kidnapping, etc. If that 
is committed by a youth 16 or 17 years of 
age, then there's a process set up whereby he 
is certified over to district court but can 
be retained by the juvenile court. So the 
juvenile court will have a chance to hear 
that in a preliminary hearing type situation 
and be able to make a decision that, no, 
there are programs for this youth that would 
still make him amenable to what can be done 
in juvenile court and he would be retained. 
It does away with the direct filing so the 
court, the prosecutor will not be able to 
directly file any more, but will go through a 
preliminary hearing process in front of the 
juvenile court for those youth under the age 
of 16. At our committee hearing, we had an 
argument by the ACLU that this violated 
constitutional rights. I'm reminded of a 
statement my good friend Senator Chic Bullen 
said, if you get four lawyers together 
arguing what is due process, you'll get six 
different opinions. But I can assure you 
that this bill has been examined very 
carefully by lawyers on that issue of due 
process and feel satisfied that it does 
satisfy the due process requirement. 
Another question came up in committee whether 
we ought to lower that age from 16 to 15. 
The 16 age was taken because there are a 
number of factors that occur at 16, but also 
3 
in looking at the implementation of this 
bill, the current data would show that there 
are probably going to be between 5 0 and 7 5 
youth that will be impacted by that that have 
just been in place. To lower that age, we 
may come back and want to do that. But this 
time, as we move forward, we think the 
appropriate age is 16 and that's the line 
that we want to draw. 
Again, the message, we hope, and it's a 
tragic part of our society, that there's 
going to be youth who are going to end up in 
the state prison because of their actions. 
But the feeling is that there is mechanisms 
within the adult system that if they really 
don't warrant going to state prison, they can 
be protected; but, on the other hand, many of 
these youths or most of these youths will end 
up in prison anyway, and we may as well get 
them down there and protect society during 
that time period. 
This bill has been included in the Governor's 
budget for funding, has a fiscal note 
obviously with it. But as I've indicated to 
the committee and I'll indicate to you, it's 
only a part of the Governor's program. The 
other very important part is to address the 
things that we need to do in prevention. 
Some of the programs in public education the 
Governor's already led into to do and that 
we've done, I think, will impact what we're 
doing. Also, I think this gives a signal 
that will be helpful in the areas of 
prevention. And the other part of the parcel 
will be, sadly enough, construction of more 
prison space or making available. Some of 
these youths, quite frankly, are a severe 
danger not only to themselves but to society 
and should be removed from the streets. 
Mr. President, that is a synopsis of Senate 
Bill 111. Again, has wide and broad base 
support. I think it is an important step for 
this Legislature to take. 
Mr. President: Thank you. Senator Hull. 
Sen. Hull: Thank you. I was in the committee when this 
was heard, and I do have some concern. I am 
supportive of this bill. My concern is the 
age at which they can be certified for the 
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district court, which is 16. And it's been 
discussed. 
Sen. Hillyard: They can certify below the age of 16. 
Sen. Hull: That is correct. 
Sen. Hillyard: It's automatic at 16. 
Sen. Hull: It is automatic at 16. And my concern, and 
I've asked this question on several of the 
bills that have come up dealing with juvenile 
justice, why they selected 16, and it's kind 
of a random age, and I've received several 
answers. One that, I guess the best answer 
was that's the age you get a license so 
you're more accountable. But there will be 
other bills coming through, and I think I 
will make, try to make an amendment to make 
that lower, and another one dealing with 
confidentiality. But I'm wondering, really 
in our society where these kids are in 
schools, it's drilled into their minds that 
at age Ninth Grade that, as least as far as 
their academic behaviors are concerned, those 
go in to stone, those credits and all their 
behaviors and that are kept on school records 
for public use for the rest of their lives, 
from Ninth Grade on. And I'm wondering, if 
we ought to not, since that is already 
embedded in their minds that they should be 
accountable then, the colleges use the Ninth, 
Tenth and Eleventh Grades for their 
accountabilities, if not that is the age 
where they ought to be taught in the courts 
to be accountable, too. That's my only 
concern. I am for, supportive of this bill 
as is. 
Sen. Hillyard: I appreciate Senator Hull raising that issue. 
And in response to it, in talking to Camille 
Anthony, who is the director of CCDJ, her 
comment was again, in checking back over, 
they wanted to keep it at age 16 to see how 
the thing works out. And if it turns out, 
Senator Hull, I would be more than happy to 
have you sponsor the bill to lower the age. 
Mr. President: Senator Howell. 
Sen. Howell: Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe we can just 
make a little amendment here to do that 
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little friendly amendment, Camille. How 














Senator Hillyard, as you know, I had the bill 
with regards to concealed weapons and minors, 
and that was one that I was very concerned 
about because on a daily basis, we see, not 
on a daily basis but quite often, we see 
young people who are carrying concealed 
weapons walking up and down Main Street and 
so on and so forth. How would that, how 
would your bill deal with those offenders? 
We clarify a conflict in the law currently. 
There's a conflict in the law because 
prosecutors can tell you that they can 
directly file on anyone directly in an adult 
court. 
Right. 
That's what they did in the case of the West 
High student. 
Right. 
The juvenile court judges will tell you, in 
reading the law, they can't do that and they 
can bring them back. Now we resolve that 
issue. They can no longer directly file. 
What's going to happen, if you're 16 or 
older, one of these crimes, then you'll go 
directly to an adult system. If you're under 
age 16, you will then file in juvenile court 
but request the juvenile court certify the 
youth over. So you could have a 14 year old 
who could be, in fact, certified over and 
treated as an adult, but the juvenile court 
would have a preliminary hearing to decide 
whether that transfer ought to be made. 
So the juvenile justice then would make the 
recommendation to bind them over as an adult? 
That's correct. 
Okay. Are we confident, and I guess this 
gets back to the age factor, are we confident 




when there•s a 14 year old who has been 
involved in a felony, let's say? I mean, how 
do I get warm fuzzies that they're going to 
make this decision about turning them over? 
I mean, that's my concern, is that kid, 
individual, who sees no future but they're 
willing to shoot someone. 
Well, let me tell you the problem we had last 
year and what got the opposition to my bill 
was the frustration of juvenile court judges 
that they would get a young man or young 
woman and say, "You're going to spend eight 
months in a secure facility," walk out of the 
court, and youth correction would say, "We 
don't have the room for you, you're out of 
here." It was a joke. And so what we've 
really done is now given the juvenile court 
more play in what they're going to do. 
Okay. And that, that's the very situation is 
to say, "We're filled up, sorry you've 
committed this terrible heinous crime, but we 
can't take any more." So I think that, if 
what you're saying is now they have an 
alternative to say, "You're certified as an 





And that's correct. And that's part of the 
package. I mean, to do this bill alone 
without the prevention, without more bed 
space, would be a mockery to the system and, 
I think, a fraud on the people of the state 
of Utah. We're doing all three of them. 
Mr. President, I withdrew my senate bill with 
regards to juveniles and possession of guns 
for this very reason. And this satisfies all 
the requirements that I had in that bill, so 
I commend Senator Hillyard for doing a great 
job on this. 
Thank you, Senator Howell. Senator Hillyard. 
Are there any further questions of Senator 
Hillyard? Senator Hillyard, would you like 
to sum up. Oh, excuse me, Senator 
McAllister. 
Sen. McAllister: Senator Hillyard, I have a concern with 
regard to the fiscal note that's on page 21. 











Now those figures, now if I understand 
correctly, you expect that there would be 2 
murders within that first full year, 15 first 
degree, and so on, is that correct? 
I'd have to, I'd have to go to Camille, who 
has put this in. 
Is that a proper assumption? 
Yes. 
Well, the concern I have then, if you look 10 
years from now, you're expecting 9 times more 
murders, over 10, probably 12 times more 
first degree, probably 3-1/2 times more 
felonies, and so on. Do you really feel that 
in 10 years, we're going to be living in an 
environment, in a society where such crimes, 
or is it just population? I'm really 
overwhelmed with that kind of statistics. 
I understand. It's a cumulative buildup type 
thing in the system. But, again, I can have 
somebody address that fiscal note directly if 
you want. But my understanding is, is that 
the 18 reflects a buildup of over those time 
periods. 
I see then. It says 10th year, and there's 
nothing to indicate accumulative on that. 
Are you saying then that the fiscal note for 
the first year would be $1,338,000, but 
because we're dealing with a part of a year, 
it's $351,800? 
That's correct. 
But in the 10th year, we're not looking at 
$8,000,000 in that year alone (but that's in 
a sense what it says), but you're saying, 
then if the first year is $1,338,000, it 
ought to be something like 10 times that in 
the 10th year, and it isn't. 
I would have to have Leo, who prepared the 
fiscal note, as you know, he doesn't go just 
directly on what somebody tells him, he put 
some things together. I'd be glad to answer 
it on the third reading. 
Sen. McAllister: I think that's fine, but I'd like an answer 
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I'll get that information. 
Any further questions of Senator Hillyard? 
Mr. President. 
Mr. President, before I sum up, personal 
privilege, I have an unrelated matter. 
Mr. President 
Mr. President, in summation, I think that 
we've pointed out very well this is a bill 
that's been worked on very hard by a number 
of people. I am fortunate enough to be just 
merely a spokesman to represent hundreds of 
hours that have been put on this problem. We 
realize this is not going to solve the 
problem, it's a combination of other things 
that need to be put together. But I think 
it's an excellent beginning, and I would urge 
the support of this body, and I'd call for a 
question on the bill. 
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Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by 
Lyle W. Hillyard. Committee vote: 9 yes, 
0 no, 3 absent. 
Representative Fox. 
Yes, thank you, Mr. Speaker. Before I begin, 
1 would like to move the amendments that have 
been passed out under my name for Senate 
Bill 111. Perhaps we ought to check and make 
sure the body has those. Just been passed 









Those who do not have the amendments of 
Senate Bill 111, raise your hand so we can 
see. The circle does not, maybe we ought to 
circle and go on for a minute. 
That will be just fine while the 
pages . . . . 
I have a motion to circle Senate Bill 111. 
Discussion that motion. Saying that, all in 




The motion carries. The bill is circled. 










Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would move that we 
uncircle Senate Bill 111. 
We have a motion to remove the circle from 
Senate Bill 111. Would you state the title. 
Yes, Serious Youth Offender. 
Discussion of the motion to uncircle, 





The motion carries, 
You may proceed. 
The bill is uncircled. 
Yes, thank you. I think everyone now has the 
amendments that were just passed out. I 
would like to move those amendments on page 
19, line 21 and after 1, delete "proceedings" 
and insert " except as provided in section 
78-3a-25 and 78-3a-25.1 proceedings" and page 
19, line 29, after "violations" insert 
"criminal proceedings under section 78-3a-25 








jurisdiction of the court under section 78-
3a-16(l).M Now, what that does is currently 
our code states that juvenile court evidence 
may not be used any place else other than the 
juvenile court. To effect the provisions of 
SB111, Serious Youth Offender, we need to 
exempt the crimes committed that would fall 
under this bill. So we wanted to, we have to 
make that exemption in the current code. 
The motion is that we accept the pink sheet 
amendment under Representative Fox's name 
dated February 23, 1995 at 5:08 p.m. 
Discussion of the motion to amend. Seeing 
none, all those in favor of the motion to 




The motion carries. 
You may proceed. 
The bill is amended. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Unfortunately, Utah 
has seen a tremendous expansion of our young 
people who are committing serious crimes--
murder, all sorts of drive-by shootings. We 
see all these things happening. Frankly, 
we're at a loss to how to deal with these 
young criminals. They are still under age, 
but they are hardened criminals nonetheless. 
The serious youth offender bill is the 
product of a year-long effort from Utah's 
criminal and juvenile justice professionals 
to create a new category of crime that will 
safeguard the public and hold violent and 
chronic juvenile offenders accountable. What 
it does is it makes it so the district court 
has exclusive original jurisdiction over 
juveniles age 16 and older charged with 
aggravated murder, murder and any felony 
committed subsequent to confinement in the 
most secure youth offender facilities. 
Juveniles age 16 years and older who commit 
one of the other ten serious offenses against 
a person will be charged with adult crimes. 
The preliminary hearing is held in the 












finds probable cause, the burden will shift 
to the defendant to show that he or she 
should remain in the juvenile court. And 
unless the defendant fits some stringent 
criteria, he or she will go directly to trial 
as an adult in the district court. Juveniles 
who do not meet the serious youth offender 
criteria may still be tried as adults in 
district court under the current 
certification process. For consistency, 
those cases will also have preliminary 
hearings in the juvenile court. I am glad to 
answer questions. 
Representative Bresnahan. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor 
yield? 
Yes. 
I have a question regarding the section 
beginning on page 6 and 7 regarding a felony 
committed by a juvenile age 14 or older. And 
if you wouldn't mind, I'd like to understand 
the difference between what was said earlier 
in the bill about 16 and older and this 
section regarding 14 and older. 
Under current law, the burden of proof is on 
the State to show why they shouldn't. This 
new change, it would shift that burden to the 
defendant to prove why they should be judged 
as a juvenile. 
So, this--
As an adult, I'm sorry. 
This makes it easier for us to certify some 
of these offenders as adults? Is that my 
understanding? Is that correct? 
Yes. 
That's the only question I have. I'd like to 
say that I do support this bill very 
heartily. It is needed. I have been, I've 
taken the time to tour our juvenile 
facilities. I've gone through every step of 
the way that a juvenile could go through 
those facilities at all the different levels. 
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And I've had opportunity not only to 
interview the staff at those facilities but 
many of the juveniles involved there as well 
as some of their parents. It is quite clear 
to me that we are dealing with a large 
portion of the juvenile population who are 
not only violent offenders but they are 
repeat violent offenders. 
And after having an opportunity to first-hand 
see them and to gain some understanding of 
their circumstances and the various things 
that are happening in their lives, I think 
the greatest service that we can do for them 
is to intercede as early as possible in the 
chain of events that lead them down a life-
long road of violence and constantly 
requiring incarceration by our society. 
Hopefully, by taking action early, by being 
strong early and getting tough early, we're 
going to prevent the continual repeat 
offenses that seem to take place over and 
over again, where we're hearing stories 
almost daily of youths that have been through 
this system time and time again, go back out 
into society, and continue to cause greater 
harm and greater injury to others, create 
more crime. And not only do they do get 
involved in it, but they're bringing others 
along with them. I believe that the only way 
that we're going to be able to see a decrease 
is to get tougher, particularly on the youth 
offenders, and I think this is an excellent, 
excellent bill and it's worthy of all our 
support. Thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: Representative Barth. 
Rep. Barth: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Let me start off by 
saying this is a good bill. There's a lot of 
thought and energy that have gone into this 
bill. This bill is a couple of things, 
though. It's not a cure-all. Anybody who 
thinks that this bill is going to take all of 
these serious youth offenders off the streets 
and we're going to be rid of that problem is 
mistaken, but it goes a long ways in doing 
that. It's not the last step in fixing a 
system that is antiquated that we need to 
take, but it is a significant and important 
step. This is going to take some kids off 
the street and put them into the adult system 
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faster than if we don't pass this bill. This 
bill will get them off the streets two years 
earlier. 
We're talking about 16 year olds that are 
going to get to the adult system eventually. 
They're continuing their behavior. They've 
had their one shot at the juvenile system. 
They're going to get into the adult system. 
We need to be mindful of a couple things, 
though. The kid needs a one-stop good shot 
at the juvenile system and the resources that 
are there. 
Some people have said the average stay for a 
juvenile in the juvenile facility is eight 
months. That's true. But you're lumping in 
there children that have been in there for 
years, putting that into the average, take 
the top 10% out and the bottom 10% out; the 
average stay is about three months. That's a 
beds problem. This addresses a different 
problem, and we need to address that beds 
problem as well, and we are in this 
Legislature to some degree. 
We're not throwing kids away after this. The 
kids have had a one-shot at the juvenile 
system, and we need to start getting tough 
with them. We need to let them know that 
their behavior is unacceptable, and they need 
to change if they're going to be allowed out 
in society. I would urge you to vote for 
this bill heartily, but do it mindfully that 
this is not the last step in fixing the 
juvenile justice problem that we've got in 
the state of Utah. This is not going to 
decrease gangs sufficiently that we can stop, 
rest on our laurels and quit. But it is a 




Representative M_ Johnson. 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I move previous 
question, please. 
Previous question has been called. All in 







Mr. Speaker: The motion carries. Back to sponsor for 
summation. 
Rep. Fox: I think it's all been said. I urge your 
support. Please vote for the bill. 
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